Abstract. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of many small wireless sensor nodes which are capable of sensing data and sending it to base stations. WSNs face resource constraints including limitations on communication, power, memory capacity and computational power. Also, since they are frequently deployed in hostile environments and left unattended, they are vulnerable to several attacks such as sinkhole attacks. Sinkhole attacks occur when a compromised node attracts network traffic by advertising fake routing updates. This paper first describes the challenges in detecting sinkhole attacks in WSNs. This is followed by analyzing methods to detect and neutralize sinkholes.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of small nodes able to sense and send data to base stations via a mesh network [1] . Applications include deployment by the military to track enemy movement, environmental monitoring such as fire detection and health services such as cardiac monitoring [2] [3] [4] . Unfortunately many WSNs are deployed in unfriendly areas and are often left unattended. In addition most routing protocols used in WSNs do not consider security aspects due to resource constraints including low computational power, limited memory, small power supplies and limited communication range [5, 6] . This creates opportunities for attackers. Sinkhole attacks are a typical such attack. Different methods have been proposed to detect and counter sinkhole attacks. This paper surveys and reviews these solutions.
Sinkhole Attacks
In a sinkhole attack an intruder compromises a node or introduces a counterfeit node inside the network and uses it to launch an attack. The compromised node tries to attract all the traffic from neighbor nodes based on the routing metric used in the routing protocol. When the compromised node manages to achieve that, it will launch an attack. Sinkhole attacks are a type of network layer attack where the compromised node sends fake routing information to its neighbors to attract network traffic to itself [7] . Due to the ad hoc network and many to one communication pattern of wireless sensor networks where many nodes send data to a single base station, WSNs are particularly vulnerable to sinkhole attacks [8] . Based on the communication flow in the WSN the sinkhole does not need to target all the nodes in the network but only those close to the base station. We consider two scenarios of sinkhole attacks. In the first the intruder has more power than other nodes. In the second the intruder and other nodes have the same power. In both cases the intruder claims to have the shortest path to base station so that it can attract network traffic. In a wireless sensor network the best path to the base station is the basic metric for routing data Fig. 1 . Two illustrations of sinkhole attack in WSN a) using artificial high quality route b) using worm hole [8] In Figure 1(a) ; the intruder has greater computational and communication power than other nodes and has managed to create a high quality single hop connection with the base station. It then advertises its high quality routing message to its neighbors. After that all the neighbors will divert their traffic to the base station to pass through the intruder and the sinkhole attack is launched.
In Figure 1 (b) the sinkhole attack is launched in conjunction with a wormhole attack. This attack involves two compromised nodes linked via a tunnel or wormhole [6] .
Related Work
Due to resource constraints traditional security mechanisms are not efficient for a WSN. Different researchers have proposed different solutions to detect and identify sinkhole attacks in wireless sensor networks. This section discusses these solutions.
Existing Approaches
We have identified the following approaches by different researchers to detect and identified sinkhole attack in wireless sensor network. Approaches taken by previous researchers may be classified into anomaly based, rule based, statistical methods cryptographic key management, and hybrid systems. Anomaly-based: in anomaly based detection normal user behavior is defined and the intrusion detection strategy is to search for anything that appears anomalous in the network. Rule based and statistical approaches are a subset of anomaly based detection approaches [9] .
Rule based: In the rule based approach rules are designed based on the behavior or technique used to launch sinkhole attacks. These rules are implanted in intrusion detection system running on each sensor node or on specialized monitors [10] . Any node will be considered an adversary and isolated from the network if it violates the rules.
Statistical: In statistical approaches data associated with certain activities of the nodes in network is recorded. For example, the network could monitor the normal packet transmission between the nodes or monitor resource depletion of the nodes such as CPU usage. Then the adversary or compromised node is detected by comparing the actual behavior with the threshold value which used as reference, any node exceeding that value is considered an intruder. Cryptographic: In this approach the integrity and authenticity of packets traveling within the network is protected by using encryption and decryption keys. Any packet transmitted in the network is encrypted such that to access that message requires a key and any small modification of the message can be easily detected.
Hybrid:
The combination of both anomaly and cryptographic approaches is used in this approach. The false positive rate produced by anomaly based methods is reduced in this approach due to the use of both methods [11] Another advantage of this approach is being able to catch any suspicious nodes when their signature is not included in detection database.
Summary of Previous Research
Rule Based Approaches: Krontiris et al. have developed distributed rule based systems to detect sinkholes [12, 13] . Their system runs on all individual sensor nodes. A collaborative approach can then used to identify and exclude the sinkhole. Tumrongwittayapak and Varakulsiripunth proposed a system that uses the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) value with the help of extra monitor (EM) nodes to detect sinkhole attacks [9, 10] . One of their functions is to calculate the RSSI of nodes sending packets and send it to base station with the ID of source and next hop when nodes are deployed. The base station uses that value to calculate a VGM (visual geographical map). Later when the EM sends updated RSSI values and the base station identifies a change in packet flow from previous data a sinkhole attack can be detected Sheela, Kumar and Mahadevan proposed a non-cryptographic method using mobile agents to defend against sinkhole attack [14] . The mobile agents create an information matrix of each node by analyzing data transfer. Those information matrixes prevent wireless sensor nodes from believing the false path from sinkhole node.
Roy et al. proposed a Dynamic Trust Management system to detect and eliminate multiple attacks such as sinkhole attacks [15] . Each node calculates the trust of its neighbor node based on experience of interaction; recommendation and knowledge then sends it to the base station. The base station decides which node is a sinkhole after it receives several trust values from other nodes. Statistical Approaches: Ngai, Liu and Lyu proposed a statistically based intruder detection algorithm to protect against sinkhole attacks in wireless sensor networks. Their algorithm involves the base station in the detection process. The results show the accuracy rate is good and the method has low communication overhead [8] .
Chen, Song and Hsieh proposed a GRSh (Girshick-Rubin-Shyriaev)-based algorithm, essentially a statistical algorithm, for detecting compromised nodes in wireless sensor networks [2] . In this solution the data associated with certain resources or activities of the nodes are collected and analyzed. Then that value (threshold) is established and used as a reference to detect a malicious or compromised node in the network. Cryptographic Approaches: Sharmila and Umamaheswari proposed a message digest algorithm using cryptography to detect sinkhole attacks [16] . In this system the sinkhole node is detected using an authentication key. When a node advertises new path information the node receiving it creates a digest of the message and sends it both via the original path and the path containing the suspect node. If the new node compromises the message the digest will be incorrect.
Papadimitriou et al. proposed two protocols, RESIST-0 and RESIST-1, that use a cryptographic approach in routing protocols to address the problem of sinkhole attacks [17, 18] . All authentication activity and signing of data message are done using public and private keys pre-established before the network is deployed Hybrid Approaches: A Hybrid Intrusion detection system was proposed by Coppolino and Spagnuolo to detect sinkhole and sleep deprivation attacks [11] . The proposed system combines anomaly and signature-based detection. Detection of anomalous behavior is used to insert suspicious nodes on a blacklist after analyzing the collected data from neighbors.
Conclusion and Future Work
While preventing sinkhole attacks in WSNs is difficult there are a number of promising approaches. Which approach to use depends on the particulars of the WSN in question. For example, a WSN where the sensor nodes are difficult to subvert and have sufficient power may be well served by a cryptographic approach although key distribution and initial authentication remains a significant problem. WSNs where new nodes are not added after initial setup may be well served by a rule based approach. Another significant challenge is application in real world WSNs beyond the laboratory. One interesting area for further research is avoiding sinkholes in ad hoc mesh networks where the devices are not specialized such as cell phone or wireless laptop networks.
